Security language is opaque. When we hear or read the word ‘security’ we are often left to guess at its precise meaning: at the epistemic and evaluative claims that are being made by the author or speaker. In part, the opacity of the word ‘security’ is the result of a complex etymological history and a corresponding proliferation in contemporary definitions of what it means to be secure. Philosophical engagement with security promises to make clear the structure, content, hidden value commitments, and (potential) incoherence of the concept as it is used in other disciplines. From an explanatory perspective, precise definitions of security give scholars a standard to assess descriptive claims about the precise of absence of security, and forge explanatory linkages between security and other concepts (such as power, domination and justice). Normatively, philosophical engagement with security can help structure critiques of security policy, identifying the precise values at stake and the hidden moral commitments of particular policy approaches. Yet, by and large, this promise as gone unfulfilled. Whilst security seems central to many moral and political problems, sustained examination of the concept by contemporary philosophers is rare.

In this chapter I seek to re-ignite philosophical interest in security by uncovering some of the ways in which the concept has been both understood and misunderstood. I begin by exploring the scarce historical understandings of security within the Western philosophical canon, from

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the Epicureans through Hobbes and on to contemporary political philosophy, identifying the key themes which arise within the literature. I then provide an account of the structure of the concept of security, which lays bare its relationship to contemporary debates on the distinction between “natural” and “social” threats, on the political significance of fear, and on the nature of rights. Finally, I identify four key problems in moral and political philosophy – the balance between state and individual security, between liberty and security, the status of moral principles during emergencies and the trade-off between privacy and public safety – where a finer grained understanding of security can benefit normative theorising.

I. The History of ‘Security’

Contemporary usage of ‘security’ includes an incredible diversity of meaning.² ‘Security’ can denote a type of financial instrument, a psychological condition, systems of defence, a physical state of being, and much more besides. Whilst much of this contemporary diversity appeared only in the twentieth century, it is the product of a long and complex etymological history. In what follows I lay out a roughly chronological history of the word ‘security’, highlighting the major shifts in meaning and emphasis from its etymological antecedents in Greek and Latin through to the twentieth century.

The Ancients and ataraxia

The direct etymological antecedent of ‘security’ is the Latin securitas: which literally translates as “freedom from care” (from the phrase sine cura: without care) (Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1982). Whilst there are some important ambiguities, Roman and Medieval usage of securitas referred primarily to a serene state of mind.³ This state of mind was, in the pre-Christian era at least, intimately connected with a quiet and reflective life disconnected from the baser pursuits of politics, business and society. In this sense, securitas and the reflective

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² At least 20 different definitions of the noun ‘security’, a further 21 definitions of the adjective/adverb ‘secure’, and 28 of the verb ‘secure’ can be found in the 2nd Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary.
³ See Arends (2008, p. 269)
life which accompanied it were not only seen as valuable but where so virtuous as to be the “object of supreme desire” (Cicero quoted in Rothschild, 1995, p. 61).

This close connection between the early Roman usage of securitas and a serene disposition is a product of its association with the Greek concept of ‘άταραξία’ (ataraxia), which refers to an “impassiveness (or) calmness” (Liddell and Scott, 1940). This concept is associated predominantly with the Epicurean tradition, which viewed the possession of a serene disposition as one of the prerequisites for eudaimonia (‘flourishing’) (Striker, 1990). The Epicureans viewed the attainment of ataraxia as a purely internal project, not only unbound from the concrete facts of an individual’s circumstance, but hindered by too great a participation in civic life. Ataraxia, rather than something which could be furthered by living within a functioning political community, was to be found in detaching oneself from religious and political commitments and pursuing a life of quiet reflection.

The notion that the Roman concept of securitas is synonymous with the Greek concept of ataraxia is attractive, but there are two important caveats to this simple story. First, securitas was not solely associated with a state of mind, but also with the concrete circumstances which made the attainment of that state of mind possible. Whilst in early Latin securitas may have straightforwardly referred to an inner calm, in later Roman usage (c. 1st-3rd century CE) securitas became associated with the Pax Romana which assured the physical safety and political liberty of Roman citizens (Arends, 2008, p. 270). The printing of coins declaring “securitas publica” and “securitas perpetua” during the tumultuous reign of Gallienus typifies this shift, in so far as the coins formed part of a propaganda effort to remind citizens of the empire which underwrote their comparatively serene and carefree lives (Hammond, 1963; Mathew, 1943). The Epicurean notion that securitas was a purely internal project was thus replaced by an acknowledgement that concrete circumstances could undermine the attainment of tranquility.

Second, securitas was not always viewed as a valuable trait. The literal Latin meaning of ‘freedom from care’ imbues the term with an ambiguous value: sometimes denoting an admirable quality of calm wisdom, sometimes denoting foolhardy self-assuredness or carelessness (Arends, 2008, p. 269). As the meaning of securitas shifted to encompass the
external circumstances which underpinned an individual’s carefree state of mind, it further reinforced that an individual could be unjustifiably carefree. Indeed, early Christian usage of *securitas* referred to a sinful kind of certitude, and this meaning carried over into early English usage of ‘security.’ Thus, as the connection between *securitas* and the external world began to strengthen, so did the term acquire a negative connotation.

Whilst these points complicate the picture, the meaning of *securitas* is dominated during the pre-Enlightenment period by an association with a sense of internal calm and freedom from fear. The classic association between *ataraxia* and *securitas* inaugurates the connection between the concept of security and being free from fear. This is security as a psychological disposition – manifested as a defeasibly valuable state of mind that individuals hold largely without reference, or in opposition, to their external circumstances. Some of this sense remains in standard usage throughout the Latinate languages. In modern French, *sécurité*, principally denotes the feeling of being safe and the Spanish, *seguridad*, also holds a similar sense. Since the great works of Enlightenment political philosophy, however, the English language concept has lost much of this meaning. We now turn to consider this shift.

**The Enlightenment and asphaleia**

Although pre-Enlightenment usage of *securitas* is profoundly influenced by the concept of *ataraxia*, during the Enlightenment, *securitas* (and in English: ‘security’) came to be associated with an entirely different Greek concept: “άσφαλεία” (*asphaleia*). In the Greek, *asphaleia* is a negation of *sphallô*, which is a term associated with ancient wrestling, meaning “make to fall, overthrow, (properly) by tripping up” (Liddell and Scott, 1940). Ancient Greek usage of *asphaleia* mostly implied the physical stability of an individual or object but, as Arends (2008, p. 265) notes, it was also used to denote the stability of city-states and empires. The most prominent example of such usage is found in Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*. In the famous dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians, *asphaleia* is repeatedly used by Thucydides to denote the stability of the Athenian Empire (see, in particular, Book V, chap. 91-99). The preoccupation of the Athenians is to avoid the

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4 see the use in Macbeth: “…security; Is mortals’ chiesten enemy”. (Shakespeare, 1988 act 3, scene 5, line 31)
bloody collapse of their empire and ultimately the ‘overthrow’ (here, a version of sphallô) of
their city state by its former colonies in violent war. Asphaleia, in this sense, bears a striking
resemblance to the modern concept of national security.

The association between ‘security’ and asphaleia owes much to the peculiar intellectual
trajectory of Thomas Hobbes, and the profound influence of his thought on later political
philosophers. Hobbes’ first substantial work, written well before his influential political
philosophy, was his 1628 translation of The History into English. In this formative work,
Hobbes translated asphaleia as, variously: ‘assurance,’ ‘protection,’ ‘safety’ and ‘security’
(Thucydides, 1843). The preoccupation with stability and protection within Thucydides work,
particularly from physical violence and war, infused the later Hobbes’ work and his usage of
the word ‘security’ (see Schlatter, 1945). In his first substantial original work, The Elements
of Law (1640), we see the emergence of a political philosophy preoccupied with physical
safety, which he equates with security:

The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the
right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which
he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so
relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when
he can foresee no violence to be done unto him…(Hobbes, 1994, chap. 20)

Thus, writing Leviathan in 1651, he supposes that the “end of common-wealth” is “security,”
– by which he meant the mechanism by which citizens get “themselves out from that miserable
condition of war” (Hobbes, 1996, chap. 17, §1). Furthermore, in Hobbes’ subsequent Latin
translation of Leviathan (published in 1668), he uses ‘securitas’ to refer to just the same
concept of physical safety. Hobbes’ use of ‘security’ and ‘securitas’ to denote physical safety
is an important milestone in the history of the word, and highlights that for Hobbes ‘security’
(and securitas) refer to the Thucydidean concept rather than the Epicurean affect.

Hobbes’ interpretation of security not only firmly establishes the primacy of the concrete over
the psychological in the concept of security; it also inaugurates the Enlightenment belief that
security can only be guaranteed by a political authority. For Hobbes, the legitimacy of the
state is dependent on its ability to protect its citizens “from the invasion of foreigners, and the
injuries of one another” (Hobbes, 1996, chap. 18, §13). Hobbes famously contends that
citizens seeking security can only achieve that end by subordinating their natural right to self-defence to the state. Writing in a similar vein, Locke, in 1690, considers that the tie which binds men and women in political community is one which “secure(s) them from injury and violence” (Locke, 1690 Book II, chap. 2, §8). Later figures, such as Condorcet, Paine and Rousseau, likewise saw security as a guarantee, given by the state, that citizens will be protected from violence against their person and property (Rothschild, 1995, pp. 63–65). This is put into even starker terms by Leibniz, who defines the state “a great society of which the object is la seureté commune (the common security).” The motif, running throughout Enlightenment political philosophy, is that a citizen should not merely be free from moment to moment from violence: she should be assured that she will be safe. The association between ‘security’ and a guarantee is noted later by Bentham:

…man is not like the brutes, limited to the present time, either in enjoyment or suffering, but that he is susceptible of pleasure and pain by anticipation, and that it is not enough to guard him against an actual loss, but also to guarantee to him, as much as possible, his possessions against future losses. The idea of his security must be prolonged to him throughout the whole vista that his imagination can measure. (Bentham, 1843, chap. 7)

By grasping the sense of security as an assurance or a guarantee from one entity to another, Bentham illustrates another important connection: that between security and the domain of rights. Indeed, in many Enlightenment and Industrial Era accounts, security is enshrined as a right which is one of the preconditions for the enjoyment of all other rights. As Condorcet puts it: the “natural rights of humanity” begin with “the security of one’s person, a security which includes the assurance that one will not be troubled by violence, either within one’s family or in the use of one’s faculties” (Condorcet, quoted in Rothschild, 1995, p. 67). For Mill, it was the case that security was “the most vital of all interests” since:

…on (security) we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the

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5 For an commentary on the moral basis of Hobbes’ political theory, see Sorell (2007).

6 Leibniz, writing in French, employs the use of sûreté to denote an objective state of being safe, rather than the psychological feeling of being safe denoted by sécurité. Leibniz writes: ‘Ma définition de l’Estat, ou de ce que chez les Latins est appelé Respublica est: que c’est une grande société don’t le but est la seureté commune.’ (My definition of the State, or of what the Latins call Republica is: that it is a great society of which the end is common security) (Leibniz, 1864, p. 143).
gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be deprived of anything the next instant by whoever was momentarily stronger than ourselves. (Mill, 1991, p. 190)

The French revolution, echoing this concern for the necessity of security, enshrined the rights to “la liberté, la propriété, la sûreté et la résistance à l'oppression” (Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, 1789, para. 2). Whereas the State guaranteed each individual’s interest in sûreté, the wider freedom from anxiety denoted by sécurité was the preserve and responsibility of each individual (Rothschild, 1995, p. 63). For political philosophers of this era, security is thus a fundamental objective of all individuals which can only be gained through the State. Rational actors seeking protection from the violence of others form the State to safeguard this fundamental interest. More importantly, the state is seen as necessary for the maintenance of security, in stark contrast to the inner calm of Roman securitas to which it is at best irrelevant or, at worst, an impediment. The necessity of the state to security thus becomes enshrined within the concept itself.

**Contemporary work**

Given this rich intellectual history, we might expect a great deal of contemporary philosophical work on security. Yet whilst the concepts of justice, liberty and equality have all been thoroughly interrogated and interpreted by contemporary political philosophers (see, for instance, Anderson, 1999; Pettit, 1996; Rawls, 1985), literature explicitly targeting the concept of security is sparse. Analysis of the concept of security has largely been the domain of scholars in International Relations (and particularly the sub-field of “Critical Security Studies”): producing re-interpretations of national security, human security and the process of securitization. This is not to say, however, that contemporary political philosophy has no contribution to make to the study of security. First, philosophy is uniquely placed to help clear the conceptual thicket which has accumulated around security, identifying the conflicts and complementarities between the various conceptions of security. Second, the content of the

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7 The only contemporary analyses of security I am aware of within the Anglo-American philosophical literature are Herington (2012), Waldron (2006) and John (2011). This can be contrasted with the deep interest in the concept amongst the Continental political tradition (see Foucault, 2004; Gros, 2012).
concept of security can be informed by parallel debates within political philosophy on the status of natural and social threats, objective and subjective harms, and the nature of rights. Finally, long-standing debates within moral and political philosophy on the status of torture, privacy and emergency powers, may help inform discussions on the normative status of “security policies” within other disciplines. Philosophical engagement with the concept of security ought to therefore be a foundational component of the inter-disciplinary conversation.

II. A Conceptual Structure

Given the diversity of historical and contemporary understandings of security (many of which are explored in other chapters within this volume), it is unsurprising that security is often described as an “essentially contested concept” (Buzan, 1983, p. 6; Smith, 2005, pp. 27–28). A concept \( (x) \) is contested when there are many conceptions of \( x \) \( (x_1, x_2, \ldots x_n) \), each vying to be the proper definition of \( x \) (Swanton, 1985, p. 811). Whilst each conception may implicitly or explicitly agree to the concepts ‘common core,’ and there may be agreement that some conceptions are clearly ill-fitting, no consensus exists on which of the reasonable conceptions is uniquely fitting. This contest over the concept becomes essential when \( x \) is an evaluative concept (e.g., liberty, beauty, goodness, right, etc.), potentially constituted by a complex set of internal parts, which requires each conception to make a judgment on the relative contribution of each part to the concept’s overall evaluative character.\(^8\) The heavy emphasis on value-commitments within these conditions have lead most commentators to suggest that a concept is essentially contested, rather than merely contingently contested, when “rival uses of it express conflicting moral and political commitments between which reason cannot arbitrate” (Gray, 1977, p. 334). On a straightforward reading of essential contestability, it therefore seems as though we have good reason to suppose that security is an essentially contested concept. It signifies something valued,\(^9\) is internally complex and its constituent parts are held to contribute to its value in a diverse set of ways. Indeed, definitions of security

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\(^8\) This characterization is derived from the work of Gallie (1955, pp. 171–172), Gray (1977) and Swanton (1985)

\(^9\) cf. Baldwin (1997, pp. 10–12), who suggests that security cannot be evaluative because it is not the sole or primary goal of states. This seems to me a misreading of ‘essential contestability’, since something can obviously be valued even if it isn’t lexically prior to all other values or is sometimes traded for some other value.
are seen as “derivative” of conflicting visions of the “character and purpose of politics” (Booth, 2007, p. 109).

Properly understood, however, ‘security’ does not refer to a single essentially contested concept. Rather, we can distinguish at least three distinct concepts to which the word ‘security’ refers (see Figure 1).10 First, security can denote a kind of social and political practice. This view of security, predominant in the self-avowedly critical corners of disciplines such as International Relations, Criminology and Geography, defines security via reference to a set of social and political processes (e.g. of control, exclusion, etc.) and practices (e.g. emergency measures, “threat-defense” logics).

Second, we might view security as a particular mode of enjoying a good. It is common to suggest that a person’s job (or property, or civil rights) is secure, such that ‘security’ adopts an “adjectival” meaning – wherein it is understood to be “a mode of enjoying other goods” rather than as a good in and of itself (Waldron, 2006, p. 318). This strand of theorising on security is small, but it attempts to capture the sense in which:

‘Security’ is not something we can have more of or less of, because it is not a thing at all. It is...the name we use for a temporally extended state of affairs characterized by the calculability and predictability of the future. (Valverde, 2001, p. 85)

On this view, security is a ‘thin’ property which does not entail any claims about what kinds of things are valuable, nor their contribution to a referents overall state of affairs,11 but simply denotes a particular kind of relationship between a referent (e.g. John) and a particular good (e.g. access to water). Importantly, secure enjoyment of a good is both a tensed and modal relation. In particular, it is future-focused, such that whether or not an entity enjoys a good securely in the present is determined by facts about the future, and subjunctive, such that

10 This typology expands upon the account given in Herington (2012).
11 The distinction between “thin” and “thick” concepts is controversial within moral philosophy (see Gibbard and Blackburn, 1992; Williams, 1981, pp. 140–142), but is a useful heuristic for our purposes. Roughly, thin concepts (e.g. hot, cold, tall, bald, etc.) do not entail judgments about the goodness of particular properties, whereas thick concepts (e.g. justice, liberty, virtue, etc) do entail such evaluative judgments, often because the property which the concept describes is thought to be valuable (or, at least pro tanto valuable).
whether or not an entity enjoys a good securely is determined, not just by whether or not the entity *actually* enjoys the good, but by whether they enjoy it in a some range of possible futures.\(^\text{12}\)

Third, security can be thought of as a *state of being*. On this view, security is a ‘thick’ property of particular entities – states, human individuals, communities – which is constituted by an evaluative judgment about a subset of the entity’s overall state of affairs. This is, historically, the concept which has received the most attention from Political Theory and International Relations. Whilst we sometime speak as if there is an account of what it means to be secure *simpliciter*, in reality, accounts of being secure are always accounts of what it means to be secure as a particular type of entity. For instance, accounts of ‘national security’ should be viewed as accounts of what it means to be secure as a state, whilst accounts of ‘human security’ are accounts of what it means to be secure as an individual human being. Thus, for any class of entities, \(x\), we might imagine an account of what it means to be secure as an entity of that kind. We might therefore have different accounts of what it means to be a secure human being, a secure prisoner, or a secure state, without a fully-determinate account of being secure *simpliciter*. In this sense, this conceptualization of security can be broken down into a number of different instances of security as a state of being – i.e. national security, individual security. Much like the concepts of brotherly and romantic love, these concepts need not be seen as in contest with one another: but simply particular instances of what it means to be secure as a particular kind of entity. We might therefore say that an individual referent object, \(i\), may or may not be secure as a type of entity, \(x_i\), and may or may not be secure as a different type of entity, \(x_2\), with no holistic sense in which that referent is secure.

\(^{12}\) In this sense, security is an alethic modal property (similar to probability, possibility and necessity) which tells us about the truth of a proposition, not just in the actual world, but within some subset of possible worlds (in this case, the set of worlds which are possible futures of the present).
Keeping these concepts distinct has inordinate benefits, in so far as we can coherently discuss whether security practices (such as the subversion of democratic processes) secure the kinds of goods which are morally valuable. Likewise, we can analyze the connection between individual security and national security, without claiming that one is totally constituted by the other. Finally, this conceptual structure has benefits for interactions between disciplines, in so far as the study of the causes and consequences of security as a state of being (e.g. by psychology, law or development studies) can be used to explain and critique the deployment of particular security practices (e.g. by anthropology, international relations or geography), and vice versa.

**Security as a State of Being**

Of the three concepts which ‘security’ can refer to, perhaps the most historically important is security as a state of being. Use of the term ‘security’ – from the Roman *securitas* to national security and human security – is dominated by references to what it means to *be* secure. Typically, such conceptions identify a set of goods which a referent (the individual, the state,
etc.) must enjoy in order to be secure as an entity of that type. An account of human security might, for instance, suggest that an individual must enjoy access to adequate food, shelter and clean water, and enjoy freedom from violence in order to qualify as a secure human being. Likewise, an account of national security might suggest that a state must enjoy territorial integrity, freedom from domination and provide a basic level of welfare to its citizenry in order to qualify as a secure state (Buzan, 1983, p. 19; Lasswell, 1950, p. 51; Morgenthau, 1965, p. 562; Ullman, 1983, p. 133). Each thickly-described conception of security differentiates itself through the goods which it suggests must be enjoyed by the referent in order for it be secure in the relevant way.

Importantly, however, it is not just that the referent must enjoy those goods, they must enjoy them securely. An individual is secure not merely because he is free from violence today, but because he can be reasonably assured of being free from violence tomorrow, the next day and so on. Indeed, it seems that part of what is distinctive about thickly-described security, as opposed to wellbeing or flourishing, is that it connotes an assurance, or guarantee, that certain goods will be reliably accessible to the entity. This suggests three major points about the proper specification of the relationship between security as a state of being and security as a mode of enjoying a good.

First, the conditions for being secure as a particularly entity can be thought of as propositions of the form “\(i\) enjoys \(g\)”, where \(g\) is a good and \(i\) is a referent which could hold or enjoy that good. The truth of the proposition in the actual world tells us whether the referent will enjoy the good, whereas the security of the proposition tells us whether the referent will enjoy the good in a particular class of possible futures. Second, it is important to note that not much

\[\text{13 The content of human security is heavily contested but it in broad strokes it can be seen as involving the protection of “the vital core” or basic needs of a human life (see Alkire, 2003, p. 2; King and Murray, 2001; Owen, 2004; United Nations Development Program, 1994, p. 23).}\]

\[\text{14 This was recognised in the original UNDP report on human security, which made a clear distinction between development and security: “Human development is…a process of widening the range of people’s choices...(whereas)...human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely-and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow” (United Nations Development Program, 1994, p. 23).}\]

\[\text{15 In what follows, I will sometimes simplify the relation of enjoyment between a referent and a good such that it is expressed as a proposition, \(p\). However, where I discuss the security of \(p\) one should typically assume that I am talking about propositions of the form “\(i\) enjoys \(g\).”}\]
hinges on the idea of enjoying a good. I’m not claiming, for instance, that a referent must actually value the good in order to enjoy it, nor that the referent must even be aware of their relation to the good. The point is merely that the referent must in some sense ‘have’ the good in question – whether that requires legally possessing it, having access to it, or possessing the capability to use it are things which can be packed into the specification of the good itself. Finally, a great many different things can act as goods within the proposition, but they must be well specified. Speaking very generally, a good is just a thing or class of things which individuals could have reason to value. Goods can be concrete objects (e.g. a car), abstract objects (e.g. transportation), social phenomena (e.g. diversity, cultural tradition), particular relations (e.g. friendship), events (e.g. a sunny day), and expectations (e.g. expected utility). Any of these things can substitute for y, with the only requirement being that they are felicitously specified. What counts as a felicitous specification will, of course, be heavily contingent on the good. In general, however, the specification of the good should include consideration of the following questions:

1. Is the good a simple object (e.g. apples) or a quantity of some object (e.g. five apples)?
2. Is the good an exact quantity (e.g. exactly five apples) or merely the satisficing of some threshold (e.g. at least five apples)?
3. Is the good enjoyed in a particular mode (e.g. access to apples)?
4. Are there temporal components to the good (e.g. an apple a day)?

Getting the specification of a good right is important since it will affect both the degree to which the good is secure and the degree to which its security is valuable. For instance, our basic liberties will, in general, be more secure than our liberty per se, and the security of

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16 For an account of enjoying goods which does associate enjoyment with valuation, see Kagan (2009).
17 For instance, an individual may, variously, enjoy “access to shelter”, “legal possession of shelter” and/or “the capability to find shelter when required.”
18 I remain neutral between objectivist and subjectivist accounts of value. For a comprehensive account of these different accounts, see Griffin (1986).
enjoying those basic liberties will, in general, be more valuable than the security of enjoying all our liberties.

Given our discussion of the structure of the concept, we can now provide an account of the common core of conceptions of being secure:

An individual referent, $i$, may be secure as a type of entity, $x$, if and only if $i$ enjoys a set of relevant goods, $(g_1, g_2, \ldots, g_n)$ securely.

This is just a preliminary account of the structure of conceptions of being secure and there may well be many more specific ways of capturing the relationship between the concepts of being secure and the mode of security. For instance, one way of cashing out the sense in which Maja is a secure human being may be via reference to her secure enjoyment of the set of necessary conditions for being a human. 19 Likewise, one might seek to restrict the relevant goods to only those which are not strictly necessary but are, in some sense, the “core” goods for the particular kind of entity (see Alkire, 2003; McDonald, 2008). Regardless of the ultimately correct formulation, this structure provides a framework for systematizing claims about what it means to be secure as a particular kind of entity.

This analysis of the concept of security has two important implications for work in other disciplines. First, conceptions of being secure require several different kinds of value judgment: including on the kinds of goods which constitute security as a state of being, on the degree to which each of these goods must be enjoyed securely, and the relative importance of the secure enjoyment of each good to the security of the entity as a whole. Second, this analysis suggests that whilst each instance of the concept of being secure might be essentially contestable, this neither prevents us from analysing the concept, nor tracing the connections between different instances of security (state security, human security, etc).

We can conclude, therefore, that though there is no contest over the meaning of the word ‘security’ per se, there are numerous contests over what it means to be secure as a particular kind of entity. Furthermore, these instances of being secure are essentially contested by virtue of the large number of value judgments required to constitute each conception. The “common

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19 This formulation was suggested to me by David Wiens.
core” of each instance of being secure is the model framework we established, and in particular, its reliance on the notion of secure enjoyment. This establishes a clear framework for thinking about how the notion of secure enjoyment is crucial to accounts of what it means to be secure, and how each of these accounts relate to one another.

III. Philosophical Themes

Whilst explicit engagement with the concept of security is almost non-existent within contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy, there are three philosophical debates relevant to the study of security in other disciplines: the status of natural and social threats, the

Natural and Social Threats

The first debate is between those who prioritize protection from other agents, and those who make no distinction between ‘natural’ threats and those from other agents. In some respect this debate will resonate with those disciplines familiar with the broad and narrow conceptions of human security, since it seems to pivot on the extent to which security should emphasize the UN goals of universal “freedom from fear” or “freedom from want.” Proponents of a narrow perspective on the set of goods, advocate limiting human security to physical violence against the individual (Thomas and Tow, 2002). Proponents of a broad perspective are concerned with expanding the set of goods beyond physical violence to include the social, political and economic goods they view as the necessary for human flourishing (Ogata and Sen, 2003).

The debate also applies, however, to the concept of “secure enjoyment” in so far as what it means to enjoy a good securely may involve claims about protection from all kinds of risks or merely those arising from human agency. If there is a unifying theme to traditional accounts of national and individual security, it is that they are concerned with freedom from harms (whatever those harms consist in) which are intentionally inflicted by other agents. For individuals, security is protection from assault and murder, for the State this is protection from military conflict and the violation of its territorial integrity. The intentionality which characterises these threats is crucial to the traditional account of security, and is commonly held to ground a sharp distinction between safety and security.
Safety is a more general concern than security because safety requires prudent protection from all probable dangers, whereas security is protection from dangers arising from the illegal aggression of others (Zack, 2009, p. 91).

One way of systematizing this view is described by Pettit (1999), who suggests that his distinction between freedom as non-domination and freedom as non-interference can be understood, to a certain extent, as different ways that non-interference can be secured.

To try to secure non-interference in the protection sense is to try and reduce interference in those possible worlds where other people take against you or you are not so cunning or whatever; and to do this regardless of the probability of those worlds. To try to secure non-interference in the promotional sense is to try and reduce interference in various possible worlds, but in a way that takes account of how probable it is that those worlds are ways the actual world may be (Pettit, 1999, p. 74, fn. 7).

Whilst Pettit is concerned only with the secure enjoyment of non-interference, the two conceptions of security he describes may be generalizable to the enjoyment of other goods. Roughly speaking, on the promotional conception, the degree to which a good is enjoyed securely is solely the chance of that good obtaining. Yet securing non-interference in the promotional sense, Pettit suggests, can be accomplished simply by ingratiating oneself with the powerful or duping them into believing you are choosing according to their preferences, and thus may involve leaving control of the good in the hands of another (Pettit, 1999, p. 74).

This kind of obsequiousness may lower the likelihood of losing the good, but, in an important sense, it does not seem to protect the agent’s enjoyment of the good in a stable way. What is required is to secure non-interference in the protective sense: to reduce the probability of interference regardless of the different dispositions which powerful agents may have towards you.

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20 In later work, Pettit has clarified that this only renders certain domains non-probabilistically relevant to the analysis of freedom: the domain in which “the endangered agent’s choice-dispositions vary” and the domain in which “there is variation in the interference-dispositions of endangering agents.” It is, in this sense, not equivalent to securing non-interference across all possibilities (Pettit, 2008, p. 218).
Fear and Security

The second debate is over the relative importance of subjective and objective security. On the one hand, we might think that security is constituted by actual protection from violence (or hunger, or political oppression). On this view, security is important in so far as these goods are things which matter gravely to our future selves, and current protection of them is therefore essential to our future wellbeing. On the other hand, we might think security is constituted by freedom from the fear of violence, and is important in so far as that fear itself is currently debilitating – endangering our present (as well as future) wellbeing (Goodin and Jackson, 2007; John, 2011, p. 70). Or we might think, following Waldron, that security consists in some amalgam of these two considerations, such that it:

…comprises protection against harm to one’s basic mode of life and economic values, as well as reasonable protection against fear and terror, and the presence of a positive assurance that these values will continue to be maintained into the future (Waldron, 2006, p. 320).

The debate over the subjective and objective dimensions of security rages, not only in political philosophy but across political science, criminology and sociology.21

I would suggest, however, that the simple distinction between objective and subjective security is misleading and obscures more than it illuminates. Rather than thinking of subjective/objective security as a single distinction, we ought to think of it as encompassing two sets of distinctions. The first distinction, between the kinds of goods which constitute thick accounts of security, echoes the split between asphaleia and ataraxia. On the one hand we might think being secure consists in possessing certain concrete or material goods: such as freedom from violence, access to water, adequate nutrition and shelter. On the other, we might think that being secure consists in possessing a certain affect of assuredness, tranquillity and calm.

The second distinction is between the different perspectives from which we might assess the secure enjoyment of these goods. On the face of it, we can assess the secure enjoyment of a good relative to the facts, the available evidence or an agents actual beliefs (Parfit, 2011, pp.

21 See for instance, the concept of “ontological security” in Giddens (1991).
We can think of fact-relative security as the degree to which a good is secure given the actual facts, evidence-relative security as the degree to which an individual would be warranted in believing that a good is secure given the evidence available, and belief-relative security as the degree to which a good is secure given an individual’s actual beliefs about the world (which, of course, may or may not be warranted). Thus, an individual whose evidence about her security comes from crime reports in the local newspaper might be warranted in believing she has a 1/100 chance of being robbed this year. She may, however, believe that the newspaper and police are colluding to hide crime, and so hold the erroneous belief that she has a 1/10 chance of being robbed this year. Likewise, the newspaper reports, though diligent and normally reliable, may be at odds with the actual (objective) 1/10,000 chance of being robbed.

There appear to be two major benefits to this more nuanced account of the connection between security and fear. The first is a richer explanatory toolkit for exploring the connection between fact-relative security and the affect of security, such that the disciplines of psychology, criminology and political science can investigate the relative importance of concrete, rational and non-rational means of reducing fear of insecurity. Second, the value of fact-relative, evidence-relative and belief-relative security may come apart, such that the precise way in which security is important to flourishing can be identified and our political ends modified in suitable ways.

**A Good or a Right?**

The fourth contemporary debate concerns whether or not security is best conceived as a fundamental right to be honoured or as a good to be promoted (Pettit, 1991, p. 231). The view that security is a right is most prominent in conceptions of human rights, where it is taken to signify a right to freedom from violence by other agents (i.e. a thick, agential account of security) (Griffin, 2008, pp. 32–33; Shue, 1980, p. 30). On this account, security is a moral right in so far as all other agents possess a corresponding duty to refrain from violating the bodily integrity of the individual. Moreover, security is a political right in the sense that political authorities (i.e. the State) have a positive duty to protect each individual under their
authority from a range of “standard threats” (Shue, 1980, p. 32).\textsuperscript{22} The protection of this right is commonly held to be an either/or proposition, such that a failure to provide a sufficient degree of protection is a failure to provide any security at all. Moreover, the right to security is often held to have special status over and above that which attaches to broader civil and political rights such as the right to freedom of speech, democratic participation, etc. Henry Shue, for instance, claims that security is one of four “basic rights” upon which all other rights depend, and that protecting this right (along with the other basic rights) is necessary for our enjoyment of all other rights (Shue, 1980). In this sense, we might think that the state has a strict and non-negotiable obligation to protect all and every citizen from the full range of standard threats to their person, regardless of what this implies for non-basic or non-fundamental rights.

Contrast this account with the view that security is a good, like any other, which can be promoted and distributed in a number of ways. One such view of security is given by King and Murray, who define an individual’s security as “his or her expectation of years of life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty” (King and Murray, 2001, p. 592). Though philosophers have not typically discussed human security in these terms, this view has important parallels with work on measures of poverty (Alkire, 2003), and the notion of basic needs (Brock, 2009; Reader, 2006). On these accounts we can make interpersonal comparisons between individuals regarding the degree of security they enjoy, summarise the degree of security within a population (i.e. by simple aggregation), and investigate various distributions of security within and between communities. This view of security is undoubtedly behind the common refrain that we can “balance” the provision of security against the protection of our liberties. Precisely whether this balancing metaphor makes sense, and what it elides with respect to maximising the security of the many at the expense of the liberty (or security) of others, is a key pivot point for those who hold this view of security (Waldron, 2003).

\textsuperscript{22} The idea of a ‘standard threat’ is notoriously vague, but it identifies something important, which is that it is not a failure of security if the we fail to protect individual’s against highly extraordinary circumstances (Waldron, 2009, p. 10).
IV. Security, Liberty, Privacy and Emergency

These debates have implications, not only for theoretical work within political philosophy, but also for work on the normative implications of security practices in other disciplines. In particular, there appear to be four debates – including the use of torture, restrictions on liberty, intrusions into privacy and the use of emergency powers – which may benefit from a more fine-grained analysis of security. I briefly discuss each of these in turn.

The first debate concerns the tension between the security of the state and the security of individuals. This is a central concern of scholars investigating the normative status of national security policies (in International Relations, Anthropology and Law), and would benefit from far greater attention from political philosophers. It has long been recognised that securing the basic conditions which maintain a political order (authoritarian or democratic, legitimate or illegitimate) may involve diminishing the security of individuals (both citizens and non-citizens). What’s not typically recognised is that this tension can often be re-described as a tension between promoting the security of a great many individuals at the cost of violating the right to security of some. This is most easily apparent in the literature on the use of torture to prevent harms from terrorism. Walzer (2000, p. 40), for instance, argues that in cases of “supreme emergency”, the normal constraint against using torture lose their force, and “a certain kind of utilitarianism reimposes itself,” leading others to suggest that torture is permissible in circumstances where it is necessary to prevent catastrophic harms (Allhoff, 2012; Dershowitz, 2004). Others, argue that warranting torture fails on its own utilitarian grounds (since it ignores the downstream effects of weakening the norm on torture), and that the ‘ticking-time bomb’ methodology used to justify the supreme emergency exemption is so implausible and extreme that our intuitions are unreliable (Brecher, 2007). Regardless of the position taken, however, the dispute is one over the proper distribution of individual security rather a question of whether state security has moral worth independent of its instrumental role in ensuring individual security.

The second debate concerns the tension between liberty and security. In a seminal paper, Waldron discusses the common idea that there is an optimal balance between security and liberty, such that just as we are willing to place limits on our freedom to do as we please to
maintain security, we are willing to live with some degree of insecurity for the sake of our liberties (Waldron, 2003, pp. 193–194). One of the problems with the balancing metaphor, however, is that it may obscure a more complex set of tradeoffs between securing the enjoyment of our basic liberties and maximizing our enjoyment of liberty per se. We can envisage a case where collectively maximizing the scope and scale of our liberties (i.e. by perhaps being able to bargain away our labour rights, or to enter into exploitative contracts) involves the risk that the powerful amongst us may be able violate our basic liberties. Indeed, this is precisely the concern which appears to motivate Enlightenment philosophers, particularly Locke, for whom securing freedom from the interference of the powerful in the pursuit of our basic preferences (to not be murdered, robbed, enslaved or coerced) legitimizes the forfeiture of some of our more peripheral freedoms. In this sense, whilst a tension between security (as a state of being) and liberty is evident, and we should guard against the view that security and liberty are “two sides of the same coin” (Booth, 1991, p. 319). Critical work in criminology and human rights law may be advanced by considering whether limits on the scope of our freedoms by security practices are justified by the extra robustness of our basic freedoms which those policies may bestow (see List, 2006, p. 217).

The third dilemma is the tension between privacy and security. Of particular interest, to critically-minded criminologists for example, is the extent to which protecting individual security justifies state (or corporate) surveillance of individuals. Surveillance can come in many forms (e.g. close-circuit cameras, email snooping), be covert or overt, be targeted in different ways (e.g. at suspects, particular ethnic groups or totally untargeted), and be aimed at public (e.g. parks, streets) or putatively private acts (e.g. homes, private electronic communications). Of these types of surveillance, perhaps the most relevant to security policy is untargeted surveillance of private communications and public spaces, about which two major concerns are raised. The first is that such surveillance is inherently wrong: either because it treats all individuals as suspicious without evidence for that suspicion (Hadjimatheou, 2014), or because it involves showing disrespect for their dignity as autonomous individuals (Rubel, 2007, p. 146). Such arguments are popular, but in so far as they show that any and all untargeted surveillance, by group (be they the authorities, individuals or civil society) violate an individual’s dignity they are too strong. Whilst many
recognize the value of privacy (Bruin, 2010; Nissenbaum, 1998), some proportionate intrusions into privacy (such as metal detectors) seem necessary in order to protect individual security (Rubel, 2007, p. 141), and when in the hands of actors other than the state, to protect other valuable ends such as democratic accountability (i.e. such as when police officers are filmed by protestors). The second concern is that, regardless of whether or not surveillance is intrinsically wrong, it is often a necessary enabler of some further wrong: such as racial profiling, voyeurism by operators, and blackmail (Hadjimatheou, 2014, p. 188). This argument has power, however, only in so far as we think the introduction of untargeted surveillance raises the risk of such wrongs occurring and that safeguards to prevent such wrongs (such as outlawing racial profiling, strict penalties for misuse by those in authority, democratic oversight) are likely to fail. In this respect, the balance metaphor seems appropriate in the case of surveillance, in so far as intrusions into privacy in order to protect security may be made acceptable by enforcing principles of proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability.

Finally, we might be interested in the moral legitimacy of ‘securitizing’ issues outside of the normal security agenda (Agamben, 2005). The securitization literature views ‘security’ as social and political practice: whereby the use of “emergency measures” is required in order to protect some valued referent (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). In general, the practice of security is viewed as normatively undesirable (Burke, 2007; see Neocleous, 2008; Wæver, 1995), but there is a small literature which seeks to identify conditions in which the use of emergency measures is justified (Elbe, 2006; Floyd, 2011; Selgelid and Enemark, 2008). What’s noticeable, however, is that this literature as so far neglected the connection between the justifiability of security practices and the protection of individual security (as a state of being). Given a more complex conceptual structure, however, we can see that conflict between the concept of security as practice and security as a state of being is not necessary, and that the value of the latter may provide a ground for the justifiability of the former.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I hope to have provided some taste of the ways in which philosophy can demystify and deepen our discussion of the concept of security. In particular, by applying the
tools of conceptual analysis to the term, and investigating its genealogical history, we can begin to untangle the *aporia* of security. By making distinctions between multiple senses of security, and showing how these are compatible, philosophers facilitate the exceptional empirical and theoretical work being done in International Relations, Anthropology, Criminology and elsewhere. Likewise, other disciplines can inform and constrain the work of Political Philosophy. Psychology and Cognitive Science can provide important insights into the relationship between evidence-relative and belief-relative security, as well as the relationship between the affect of security and our beliefs about security. Work in the disciplines of Anthropology, Geography and Criminology can inform questions on the feasibility of particular security policies. Insights from international and domestic law can likewise identify the dangers of instituting emergency powers, and licensing the legitimacy of violating legal rights in ‘special circumstances.’ In this respect, there is much philosophical work left to do with respect to the concept of security, and much to be learnt through dialogue with other disciplines.

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